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Soviet Concern with Reliability;
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Soviet Concern with Reliability
EVEN a cursory reading of the Soviet literature reveals that the cen-
tral statistical authorities have been well aware of the imperfect
reliability of the data submitted to them. A closer study leaves no
doubt that they have been gravely concerned over the problem, and
that the question of accuracy of physical output data occupies the
very center of this concern. It is also clear that the main source of
inaccuracy is believed to be distortion of reported data by interested
parties, aided by the negligence, if not abetted by the connivance, of
the lower statistical agencies.
It is quite understandable that concern with data reliability
should have been greatly intensified, as it was, in the early thirties,
in view of the changes in the internal political atmosphere, the
reorganization of industrial structure and management, especially
the transition to a full-blown command economy, the turbulent
economic conditions in general, and the mounting pressure for plan
fulfillment, that characterized those years. It is also noteworthy that
within two months of the completion of the First Five-Year Plan
the USSR Supreme Court issued a resolution, dated February 27,
1933, which read (in part): "...Thespecial attention of courts
must be directed to the following criminal acts in record-keeping
and reporting...6.Premeditated submission of incorrect data with
the purpose of indicating fulfillment or overfulfiliment of a plan."
This was followed in the same year by a resolution of the Central
Executive Committee (Tsentral'nyi ispolnitel'nyi koniitet, abbrevi-
ated as TsIK) and SNK SSSR, entitled "On the Liability for the Sub-
mission of Incorrect Statistical Information and Reports, and for the
Violation of Forms and Dates of Submission of Statistical Materials
and Reports," dated November 27, 1933. It extended certain sections
of the criminal code of the union republics to apply to "intentional,"
"systematic," and "malicious" acts of the sort indicated in its title.2
'Sbornik postanovlenii Verkhovnogo Suda SSSR [Collection of Resolutions of
the USSR Supreme Court], Moscow, 1946, pp. 18f., as cited in Kh. E. Bakh-
chisaraitsev, Spravochnik zakonodatel'stvudlia rabotnikov gosudarstvennoi
promyshlennosti SSSR [Legal Manual for Personnel in State Industry of the
USSR], Moscow, 1951, p. 499.
2Sobraniezakonov i rasporiazhenii Raboche-krest'ianskogo pravitel'sttxi SSSR
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Although the specialized literature of the middle thirties was on
the whole more preoccupied with statistical organization, method-
ology, and coverage than with data reliability, it did occasionally
reveal the seriousness of the authorities' concern on this score. For
instance, the administrator of TsUNKhU, A. I. Kraval', is reported
to have told the all-union conference on industrial statistics in De-
cember 1935 that: "The struggle against distortions in record-keeping
and deception in reporting... mustbecome an integral and im-
portant part of the work of statistical agencies."3 Only a little over a
year later, such distortions and deceptions were among the charges
thrown at the alleged "wreckers" within the statistical apparatus,
among them Kraval'
Since the middle of 1948, concern with the reliability of statistical
information has been openly and frequently expressed in the special-
ized literature. It will be recalled that this was one of the reasons
cited for the separation of the statistical apparatus from the Gos plan
in August 1948, and attainment of a high level of data reliability
was one of the principal assignments given to the new TsSU at the
time. Shortly thereafter, on September 22, 1948, TsSU issued an
order demanding that the personnel of the statistical apparatus
"ensure the collection of truthful, scientifically justified, rigorously
checked, and reliable statistical data, and fight against any out-
cropping of 'localistic'[mestnicheskie] tendencies in statistical
Similar orders are said to have been issued on subsequent
occasions after inspection of the work of various local statistical
offices. The question of data reliability has been—at least until the
mid-fifties—one of the dominant themes of the editorials and articles
in Vestnik statistiki, the organ of the new TsSU, and of the various
other publications emanating from the statistical authorities in
recent years.° Virtually every address by the administrator of TsSU,
[Collection of Laws and Decrees of the Workers' and Peasants' Government of
the USSR], Moscow, 1933, No. 70, p. 417, as cited in Bakhchisaraitsev, op.cit.,
p. 499.
8Plan,1936, No. 3, p. 27. Cf. Plan, 1937, No. 8, pp. 22-26.
I. Dugin, "0 nekotorykh nedostatkakh v rabote s kadrami" [On Certain
Shortcomings in Personnel Work], V.S., 1951, No. 5, p. 55.
6 L. M. Volodarskii, Promyshlenn.aia [IndustrialStatistics],
Moscow, 1954, pp. 11-13; idem, "Gosudarstvennaia statistika I narodnokhozia-
istvennoe planirovanie" [State Statistics and Economic Planning], V.E., No. 8,
1955, p. 21; idem, Stati.stika prom yshlennosti [Statistics of Industry], Moscow,
1956, p. 14; V.S., 1952, No. 4, p. 13; 1953, No. 1, p. 23; 1958, No. 6, p. 20;
and especially the editorial entitled "Reliability—the Most Important Law of
Soviet Statistics," 1952, No. 2, pp. 8-20.
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Starovskii, by one of his chief lieutenants (Volodarskii, Ezhov), or
by one of the regional heads of the statistical apparatus before the
frequent periodic conferences of statisticians from 1951 through
1953 dwelt at length on the theme of It seems that in
those years Starovskii hardly addressed his subordinates on any
other subject, at least judging by the summaries printed in Vestnik
statistiki.
The campaign to ensure the reliability of data submitted to the
statistical offices reached its high mark approximately in 1952. After
early 1953—that is, after Stalin's death—the campaign, as such,
virtually disappeared from the pages of the specialized literature,
although occasional references to the problem of data reliability
have continued to appear. On the other hand, no outright claim of
substantial improvement in this respect has been made by the statis-
tical authorities. It is difficult for the outside observer to decide
whether there has in fact been any such improvement in recent
years, or whether the apparent subsidence of the campaign was
largely due to the internal political shifts following Stalin's death,
coupled with the usual spasmodic occurrence of such events in the
Soviet Union.
The existence of the problem of data reliability has been at-
tributed to the presence of "individual persons in enterprises and
ministries" who try to "embellish the true state of affairs, to conceal
or minimize mistakes and defects by inserting false data in their
reports."8 These individuals, it is said, are a small, irresponsible,
dishonest, and unconscientious minority; but few as they are, their
work is insidious and must be thwarted. How can these dishonest
few get away with their shady acts? They can, it is admitted, be-
cause not all functionaries of the statistical apparatus are sufficiently
alert or conscientious.
Hence there is the insistence that the record-keeping and report-
ing of enterprises and departments be subjected to constant and
thorough supervision and checking. But checking cannot reveal ir-
regularities where there is strong intention to conceal and little
motivation to uncover. This explains the exhortations to honesty and
uprightness on the part of those who submit the data and those who
receive them. Thus we read in an article over the signature of the
deputy chief of the personnel division of TsSU SSSR:°
E.g.V.S., 1951, No. 2, pp. 91-95, andNo.6, pp. 92-95; 1952, No. 2, pp.
92-95, and No. 5, p. 88.
8 Ibid., 1952, No. 5, p. 88. Dugin, op.cit., pp. 53 and 55.
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"The chiefs of the statistical administrations of the union republics
must pay close attention to the personnel of the local agencies of
TsSU; they must proceed painstakingly with the selection and de-
ployment of [statistical] workers; they must educate them in the
spirit of honesty, truthfulness, and responsibility for assigned tasks;
they must analyze the personnel, replacing the unsuitable workers
and promoting to responsible positions the able and promising
ones....
"The chiefs of the statistical administrations must insist that, in
resolving any question, all statistical workers bear only the interests
of the state in mind, that they defend these interests in matters small
as well as large, that they counter all expression of activity against
the state, of localistic and narrowly departmental interests, and all
forms of writing-up, misrepresentation, deception of the state,
etc.
A year later, an editorial entitled "Raising the Standards of Per-
formance of the Raion and City Inspectorates of TsStJ SSSR" as-
serted:10
"Truthfulness and adherence to principle are the distinguishing
characteristics of the Soviet statistician. [This statement, of course,
really means that there is some question of that.—G.G.] Everything
that raion and city inspectors, as all other Soviet statisticians, do
must be suffused with a zeal to depict the actual state of affairs cor-
rectly, objectively, and honestly. In all their work raion and city
inspectors, as all Soviet statisticians, must adhere to [high] princi-
ples, and must place the interests of the state above everything else.
[Such interests] .. requirethat Soviet statisticians produce ab-
solutely reliable data, which permit the drawing of accurate infer-
ences on the condition of the economy and the resolution of ques-
tions of its further development.
"Rajon and city inspectors are called upon to lead a decisive
struggle against anti-state tendencies, against the attempts of some
workers to place narrowly departmental and particularistic interests
above those of the state, against attempts to distort reported data—
to conceal unused equipment, raw materials, and supplies from the
state, or to include in the reports of plan fulfillment output that has
not been actually prodñced."
10V.S.,1952, No. 4, p. 13. Cf. the editorial in V.S., 1955, No. 6, where
thereferencesto honesty are implicit however.
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It is worth noting that the exhortations to honesty and appeals
to high principles in these and other passages are aimed chiefly at
the lowest levels of the statistical apparatus, that is, at those levels
which come into immediate contact with the suppliers of data, and
where, therefore, control is most crucial and corruption most likely.
The suppliers of data—especially the accountants of the enter-
prises and departments—must also remember their principles. A
well-known text on accounting in the industrial enterprise prefaces
its section on the keeping of records of finished output with the fol-
lowing remarks:"
"The quantity of output can be ascertained from the primary
documents on the transfer of finished products [to the warehouse].
However, it is not a matter of the simple arithmetic addition of the
data on output recorded [in the documents]. It must be remembered
that such an economically and politically important indicator as the
fulfillment of the output plan is determined from these computa-
tions. Therefore, the absolute accuracy and truthfulness of this indi-
cator must be assured. Any deviation from absolute accuracy and
truthfulness on the part of the figure for output represents, in our
country, a deception of the state and constitutes a crime. In dis-
tinction to capitalist records, Soviet records in general, and the
accountant's records of output in particular, give a completely ob-
jective picture of actuality."
Textbooks for students and manuals for inspectors and auditors
also provide abundant evidence of widespread distortion at the
enterprise and departmental level, and of the concern among the
various controlling authorities with this fact.12
11 M. Kh. Zhebrak, Kurs promyshlennogo ucheta [Course in Industrial Ac-
counting], Moscow, 1950, p. 242. The last sentence of the quotation is, of
course, to be understood in the hortatory rather than the positive sense. The
source proceeds tolist ways in which finished output may be recorded
inaccurately, e.g. by the inclusion of items before their acceptance by the
technical inspectors.
12Ia. German, Finansovyi kontrol' I dokumental'naia reviziia v mestnoi
promyshlennosti RSFSR [Financial Control and Documents Audit in Local
Industry of the RSFSR], Moscow, 1948; A. Kh. Ermolaev and C. R. Nak,
Dokumental'naia reviziia na zheleznodorozhnom tran.sporte [Documents Audit
on Railroads], 2nd ed., Moscow, 1950; D. I. Alenchikov, Organizats-iia i tekh-
nika dokumental'noi revizii [Organization and Methods of Documents Audit],
4th ed., Moscow, 1954; N. A. Sokolov, Kompleksnye dokumental'nye revizii
na zheleznodorozhnom transporte [Comprehensive Documents Audits on Rail-
roads], Moscow, 1955; and W. Kalkutin and W. Mitrofanow, Revision und
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The leaders of the Party are not only aware of the imperfect
reliability of the statistical data on which their day-to-day decisions
must be based, but even see fit at times to speak out on the subject.
From their point of view, the situation is doubly serious, in that
individual Party members, far from being invariably the alert
guardians of legality and morality, themselves commit acts of dis-
tortion and At one time the Party Central Committee issued
a demand to all subordinate units to uncover instances of writing up
and to turn the culprits over for criminal prosecution; yet, the
Party's "house organ" complained, the order was ignored "in some
places."14
In sum, one can infer from the specialized literature on statistics
that deception in reporting has been widespread, and that the
authorities have been well aware of this fact and have been seriously
concerned about it; although of course we are not told the over-all
magnitude, or even the preponderant direction, of distortion. The
plaintive and sometimes near-alarmist tone of the Soviet literature
on the subject of data reliability need not, however, mean that the
degree of inaccuracy in Soviet output statistics is very high from the
standpoint of the student of the Soviet economy. We must remem-
ber that the tolerances of inaccuracy acceptable for planning and
administering the Soviet command economy, which is the chief end
of Soviet statistics, may be considerably more exacting than those
with which outside observers are typically satisfied, and moreover
that the Soviets are wont to overdraw any evil that they may be
mounting a domestic "campaign" against.
Errors; Mechanization
Clerical errors may have been relatively frequent in the Soviet
Union compared to other industrial economies. Not only are Soviet
clerks as much prey to human failing as any others, but their low
educational background, especially in the earlier years of the Plan
era, their poor pay, rapid turnover, and primitive bookkeeping and
calculating equipment—all suggest this impression. It is also likely
that the dubious piece-work system of pay for statistical clerks that
was in operation during the mid-thirties led to inaccuracy.15 Still,
Kontrolle der wirtschaftlichen Tätigkeit der Industriebetriebe (translated from
the Russian), Berlin, 1955.
See P.Zh., 1955, No. 11, pp. 28-30. Cf. New York Times, June 26, 1955.
14P.Zh.,1955, No. 11, p. 29.
15Cf.Plan, 1935, No. 1, p. 56; 1936, No. 3, pp. 36-39, No. 8, p. 57, and
No. 12, p. 60; 1937, No. 1 p. 41.
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since the recording and reporting of output occupies such a crucial
place in the life of the Soviet enterprise and since industry as a
whole is a privileged sector of the economy, it is a fair guess that
statistics of industrial output suffer less from neglect and error than
do other areas of Soviet statistics.16
For a country in which the official ideology extols orderly and
complete record-keeping and in which the imperatives of planning
and of day-to-day administration of a command economy require
detailed and prompt information, the degree of mechanization of
statistical work and accounting in the USSR has been extremely
low. For instance, as late as 1953, only some 3 to 4 per cent
of the 2.3 million then employed in "record-keeping and computa-
tion" (no doubt including accounting and statistical data handling)
used electric calculating machines, while "the overwhelming bulk of
these employees still perform laborious recording and computations
•..byhand, that is, without the benefit of any mechanical equip-
ment."7 Work by hand in this case presumably does not exclude use
of the traditional Russian abacus which, although a slower device than
its Chinese or Japanese cousins, not to mention modem accounting
and calculating machines, is nonetheless a helpful and reliable aid to
computation. It may be true, as Campbell argues,'8 that greater in-
vestment in accounting machines would have yielded a high return
on the additional capital thus invested, but it is also easy to under-
stand why the mechanization of office work was for so long, and
largely still is, neglected. We only need think of the structure of
priorities that has guided Soviet planners; the abundant supply of
poorly paid, semiskilled, and almost exclusively female, clerical
labor; and the virtual lack of institutionalized incentive for the in-
dividual enterprise to raise the productivity of, and to reduce the
expenditure on, clerical workers. The brief remarks on mechaniza-
tion that follow are based largely on Campbell's useful study.
The Soviets made a very late start in mechanizing their account-
ing and statistical work, and before the war proceeded very slowly.
This may not be saying much. For instance, see Uranov's description from
personal experience of the incredible neglect of accounting and record-keeping
in some rural cooperatives before the war (Peter Uranov, "Consumer Coopera-
tives in the Soviet Union," mimeographed in Russian, Research Program on
the USSR, 1954, pp. 135ff.). However, for the reasons stated, such a picture
is perhaps not typical of industrial enterprises, except possibly the smallest.
P.Kh., 1953, No. 4, p. 94.
18 R. W. Campbell, "The Mechanization of Accounting in the Soviet Union,"
The American Slavic andEast EuropeanReview, February 1958, p. 80.
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The only mechanical device in widespread use at that time was the
so-called arithmometer, a small, hand-operated, lever-set calculator
of low speed that was invented in Russia as early as 1874. Import of
accounting and calculating machines, mostly from the United States
and Germany, was limited. Domestic production, which continued
before the war to concentrate on arithmometers, was also very small
compared to the potential demand. Both production and imports of
punched card machinery were still insignfficant. Campbell points
out that "in 1937, for instance, the United States produced for
domestic use 172,789 units of calculating, adding, adding-listing,
bookkeeping, and billing machinery, whereas the Russians planned
to produce 5,500 comparable machines and 64,000 arithmometers."9
Moreover, the quality of domestically produced machines was ex-
tremely low, and spare parts and repair services were very hard to
obtain. Campbell writes that "in terms of stocks, which is the magni-
tude we are most interested in, the lag behind the U.S. was even
greater than in production," and proceeds to estimate that, at the
end of 1940, the stock was not over "35,000 of all kinds [of such
machines] except arithmometers, the stock of which might then have
been somewhere above 300,000, depending on how rapidly the old
ones were discarded."20
During the war, due to lack of production, looting, war damage,
normal wear and tear, and the absence of spare parts and repair
facilities, the gains in mechanization that were made during the
thirties were virtually wiped out. However, since the war the Soviets
have made a much more serious effort to mechanize accounting and.
computation than before the war. In this they were considerably
assisted by the removal of dismantled German plants to the Soviet
Union and by the operation of some plants as "Soviet corporations"
in Eastern Germany. The official index, of unknown reliability,
claims a nearly twentyfold increase in the domestic production of
computing machines between 1948 and 1955; but while the output
in the former year in absolute terms is unknown, it must have still
been very small, and the significance of this increase is difficult to
appraise. It has also been claimed that the stock of such machines
grew sixfold between 1949 'and 1955,21 although again obviously
Ibid., p. 63. My emphasis.
Ibid., pp. 6Sf.
21 Vestnik mashinostroeniia, 1958, No. 8, p. 82. By 1957 the increase was
sevenfold (V.S., 1958, No. 7, p. 83). Imports of calculating machines, almost
entirely from Eastern Germany, have been as follows in recent years: 1955—
4.9 thousand units worth $2.5 million (at 4 "foreign trade rubles" to the
dollar); 1956—6.7 thousand, $3.3 million; 1957—9.2 thousand, $3.5 million
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from a very small base. The number of so-called machine account-
ing stations, which are complexes of punched card machinery, is
said to have increased 6.3 times over the same period,22 and thus
may have reached about one thousand by the end of 1955.23Since
then the stock of computing and calculating machines, including the
punched card variety, has undoubtedly continued to grow, and the
decision to establish a machine accounting station in each of the
economic regions created in 1957 probably gave a new push in that
direction. As to electronic computing machines for office work, all
indications show that at the time of this writing there are still hardly
any. In brief, although the evidence is very meager, Campbell is
able to conclude (and one must agree with him) that while "the
postwar efforts of the Russians indicate a great advance over their
prewar achievements, the degree of accounting mechanization
achieved in the Soviet Union thus far is insignificant in comparison
to that in the United States."24 This fact, he believes, greatly reduces
the fineness of detail of which Soviet accounting is capable (al-
though so far as statistical reporting is concerned there seems to be
an overdose of detail), and also slows down the flow of reports. How
much the inadequate mechanization affects the accuracy of statisti-
cal reports, and especially of industrial output data, is more difficult
to deduce. Nor is it clear to what extent the increased machine-
processing of data by the local statistical agencies in the economic
regions that is now being introduced will improve the quality (i.e.
accuracy) of Soviet output statistics.
In any case, the serious problems of the reliability of industrial
production statistics in physical terms do not seem to stem primarily
from clerical errors. On the one hand, by their very nature, errors
tend to offset one another, that is, do not lead to any discernible
bias, and, on the other hand, the importance, to the fortunes of the
Soviet industrial enterprise, of meeting physical production targets
ensures that special attention is paid to output figures. Thus, re-
liability of industrial production data is likely to suffer less from
errors than from the less "innocent" forms of distortion, to which I
now turn.
(Vneshniaia torgovlia SSSR za 1956 god [Foreign Trade of the USSR, 1958],
Moscow, 1958, p. 28 and Vneshniaia torgovlia SSSR za 1957 god, Moscow,
1958, P. 26).
22 Vestnik mashinostroeniia, 1958, No. 8,P. 62.
28 Cf. Campbell, op.cit., p. 70.
24 Ibid., pp. 70f. According to a recent evaluation by a high TsSU official:
"The degree of mechanization of statistical work, and especially of primary
record-keeping, lags far behind the requirements of the economy" (V.S., 1958,
No. 7, p. 84).
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